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Abstract: Liberal political institutions have been an enormous boon for humanity. The free 
market aspect of liberalism has led to an explosion of innovation, ranging from new kinds of 
technology and novel forms of entertainment to advances in science and medicine. And the 
emphasis on individual rights at the core of liberalism has increased our ability to explore new 
ways of living and to construct an identity of our own choosing. But liberal political institutions 
have serious drawbacks. In particular, liberalism’s focus on individual liberty rather than group 
cohesion can increase economic productivity by encouraging the free movement of people and 
capital, but this movement is associated with declines in social cohesion and fertility. While 
causation cannot be inferred from correlation, there are reasons to think liberalism tends to cause 
these problems and is ill-suited to solve them. In this essay, we hope to identify some key 
features of liberal political institutions and outline a set of challenges to the long-term 





Rather than discuss the obvious virtues of liberal political societies, we will focus on two 
negative consequences that threaten their long-run stability: declining social trust and sub-
replacement fertility. We do not claim that liberal political institutions are sufficient to produce 
these outcomes. Indeed, historically, in 19th century America and England, liberal societies had 
strong fertility and probably a high degree of social trust and cohesion (O’Neill, 2021a, 2021b).i 
But we do think the liberal institutions of these societies helped create the conditions for their 




According to the academic consensus, the chief commitments of liberal political societies 
are freedom and equality (Rawls, 1996). There are many different interpretations of freedom 
(Berlin, 1958) and equality (Sen, 1995), some of which seem to be incompatible. But most agree 
that for a society to be liberal, freedom of action should be the moral default, while government 
coercion requires justification (Gaus, Schmidtz, & Courtland, 2018). Classical liberals consider 
equality under the law to be the chief virtue of liberal institutions, whereas more radical modern 
liberals endorse something closer to equality of “fair opportunity” or even equal outcomes 
(sometimes called “equity”). 
 Despite disagreements between liberals about how to flesh out their core commitments, 
liberal institutions that prioritize individual liberty, freedom of movement, and the free exchange 
of goods, tend to evolve in particular directions. For example, to the extent that institutions shape 
social norms, the liberal rejection of a comprehensive conception of the good tends to lead to a 
diversity of norms, including norms concerning how to live and work, as well as norms 
surrounding reproduction and family life.  
 Some diversity of norms is desirable. John Stuart Mill famously advocated “experiments 
in living,” successful versions of which might be copied by other societies. But diversity can also 
lead to social strife, polarization, and distrust (Dinesen, Schaeffer, & Sonderskov, 2020). The 
kind and amount of diversity matters.  
By removing tribe or tradition as important values, liberalism tends to erode religion and 
community, which are often connected with fertility. Traditional families and communities often 
put pressure on people to have children, whereas liberal institutions tend to promote personal 
achievement and financial success. It is possible, of course, to live a traditional life in liberal 
political societies. But people are social creatures, and liberal societies that emphasize free trade 
and individualism tend to create norms that direct us to pursue educational and financial success 
– to create a life for ourselves – rather than live traditional lives in which we are accountable to 
our community and encouraged to form stable families. These social norms lead to low birth 
rates and a tenuous attachment to community. In the following few sections, we hope to explain 
how this has happened. Our explanations extrapolate from patterns. They are not knock down 
arguments, and they certainly do not blame an abstract political philosophy called “liberalism” 
for all of the problems associated with modern life. But they do identify a couple of deep 




We begin by analyzing key phenomena in modern liberal democracies such as 
urbanization, mass immigration, and associated changes in character traits and social norms. 
Then, from an evolutionary standpoint, we focus on the long-term effects of these phenomena, 
concentrating on sub-replacement fertility and declining social trust. By doing so, we challenge 
the sustainability of liberal institutions.  
 
a) The move to cities  
 
Communities work well when the population that comprises them remains relatively stable and 
small. These are the conditions in which people know one another well enough to develop and 
share a common set of norms and social expectations. In especially large and heterogeneous 
groups, norms are difficult to police through informal sanctions, and the members of a group 
(perhaps a neighborhood or city) tend to develop different standards of behavior. When large 
groups with different standards live in the same place, and there’s frequent migration in and out 
of an area, coordination becomes difficult and trust declines (Ostrom, 2000).  
 Many people have experienced a shock when they move to a large city from a small 
town. People are less polite, customs change, trust declines, and ethnic enclaves within the city 
form. This does not mean that cities are bad, or that we should avoid them. Instead, we are 
simply observing that the economies of scale that cities offer have a price. Cities are 
economically productive places, engines of innovation. And they seem to have network effects—
at least up to a point—such that additional people can create exponential economic productivity. 
One reason for this is infrastructure. Laying the pipes and electrical grid to furnish a million 
people with water and electricity in a geographically concentrated city is much easier than laying 
down the infrastructure for 1,000 small towns, each of which has 1,000 residents. The 
environmental footprint and infrastructure costs are typically much larger per resident in 1,000 
hamlets than they are in a thriving metropolis like London or Sydney (Meyer, 2013).  
Similarly, smart or creative people who live around many other people who share their 
abilities and interests can bring their ideas together in a way that benefits all of them, and has 
positive externalities for the world (Ridley, 2010). This is especially true when the average IQ of 
a concentrated population is high, and when market forces incentivize people to share their ideas 




 But the move to cities has a cost. These include a tendency for pro-social traits to be less 
rewarded than they would in a small and stable group. Getting people to cooperate without using 
force requires us to interact with the same people repeatedly, so that we can bear a reputation, 
find and reward trustworthy people, and punish free-riders (Bowles, 1998, p. 94). This is 
especially challenging in large cities when we are less likely to see the same people over time, 
and when we are less likely to suffer social sanctions for bad behavior.   
 Apart from the challenge of establishing stable norms of cooperation in large and 
heterogeneous cities that have a steady stream of people moving in and out, cities can also be 
alienating. As population density increases, the price of desirable real estate rises, and people 
tend to live in smaller housing units with less access to nature and less of a sense that they 
belong to a neighborhood. They often feel less connected to anything that resembles a 
community. This is part of what social scientists mean when they say that social capital has 
declined in modern American cities (Putnam, 1995).  
 One effect of moving to cities is declining fertility. In modern liberal societies, people 
tend to move wherever they can make the most money. These are usually cities. That means 
people move to (and create the conditions for) places that have less social trust and social capital 
than traditional neighborhoods. Moreover, these cities lack the social pressure that traditional 
communities have to form a family rather than chasing financial success. And while such 
communities may exist within cities, they are not the norm. Cities make the cost of raising 
children higher. Fertility has indeed declined in every place where wealth and opportunities for 
women have increased (Kolk, 2019). But in wealthy countries around the world, fertility is way 
below replacement, and in cities, fertility is significantly lower than in less dense neighborhoods 
(Kulu, 2011). Cities are probably the natural result of specialization and trade. They exist under 
liberal and illiberal regimes. But to the extent that liberalism encourages people to move out of 
communities and into cities in the pursuit of profit, this may be considered a cost associated with 
liberalism, even if this process happens to a lesser extent in all societies that are large and 
prosperous. 
To prevent costs such as this one, governments sometimes discourage the move to cities. 
For instance, the Chinese government regulates internal migration into cities to prevent mass 
urbanization and to maintain a sense of social order. It does so through the removal of basic 




facto illegal aliens (Boquen, 2021). Liberalism, however, cannot resort to these measures without 
violating some of its core principles, such as freedom of association and contract. So, while mass 
urbanization may affect all advanced economies, liberal governments have fewer policy 




One of the most obvious trends in contemporary liberal societies is the move toward open 
borders. Mass migration began in the late 19th century in the United States, but most migrants 
came from Europe. After the second world war, and especially in the 1960s, mass migration 
accelerated and, for the first time, large numbers of people from outside of Europe – including 
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East – migrated to liberal democracies like the USA, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, and other European countries. Mass immigration has never 
been a popular policy in the West, even if many citizens in European countries support modest 
levels of immigration among skilled workers and people fleeing war (Esipova, Pugliese, & Ray, 
2015). But there is an emerging consensus among liberal theorists that freedom of movement, 
including the movement of people across borders, is a moral right, with restrictions of movement 
needing justification (Freiman & Hidalgo, 2016; Huemer, 2010; Vossen & Brennan, 2018). 
While there are liberal critiques of mass migration (Buchanan, 1995; Joshi, 2019; Wellman, 
2008), it is increasingly common among liberal academics and progressive voters to support 
mass migration, even in the face of popular opposition by conservatives and nationalists.  
 Apart from arguments that derive from principles or ideology, liberalism as a political 
system tends to reward large corporations that import the lowest-cost workers they can find, even 
if they come from outside a nation’s borders. Liberal institutions tend to concentrate capital in 
large firms (Coase, 1937). These firms then lobby governments to import cheap labor from 
abroad. This is good for the individual firms since they can pay lower wages. And it is good for 
consumers to the extent that it lowers the prices of consumer goods. But over the long run, the 
aggregate effect of mass migration on the country in which it occurs may be to lower social trust 
and social cohesion, apart from its employment effects on the native population.  
 One explanation for why mass migration can lower social cohesion is that we are tribal 




language, religion, or other salient feature. Just being a citizen of a large and diverse state is 
unlikely to elicit much fellow feeling. Ethnocentrism is likely an adaptive trait (Axelrod & 
Hammond, 2006), even if it can have bad consequences in some contexts, such as motivating 
people to engage in genocide over disputed territory. While people are somewhat malleable in 
their ability to tolerate and cooperate with others who are unlike them, there are likely limits to 
toleration and cooperation. Liberal political societies have been testing these limits to such an 
extent that social trust has fallen in Western countries with especially high levels of immigration 
from poor countries (Dinesen et al., 2020). Indeed, recent evidence suggests that support for 
immigration falls when immigrants are ethnically distinct and poor (Schahbasi, Huber, & Fieder, 
2020).  
Despite popular opposition (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2019), political parties in liberal 
societies tend to collude with corporations to import workers and voters (though liberal 
democracies in East Asia, such as Japan and Korea, have restrictive immigration policies). 
Policymakers in liberal democracies are strongly influenced by private corporations who finance 
their campaigns and apply pressure for policy favors. Corporate executives at large firms favor 
mass migration because this allows them to select workers from a larger pool (Facchini, Mayda, 
& Mishra, 2011). One consequence is an increase in highly skilled workers. Another is an 
increase in low skilled workers to whom firms can pay lower wages than they would have to pay 
natives if the immigrants are coming from poorer countries to richer ones. But corporations and 
policymakers often ignore the long-term demographic effects of migrant workers on the larger 
political society in which they live. These effects, whether positive or negative, are externalities 
– unintended byproducts of an otherwise mutually beneficial exchange between corporation and 
migrant worker, or between a political party and the beneficiaries of that party’s policies.iii 
Immigration is not a uniquely liberal phenomenon, though. Policymakers in non-liberal 
regimes may or may not facilitate immigration depending on their interests and values (Natter, 
2018). But because they do not necessarily have to be concerned with elections, they are not as 
dependent on short-run profits or the approval of profit-seeking firms. Nor do they always 
subscribe to principles of universal rights. Because rulers in non-liberal regimes govern for 
longer periods and often without democratic legitimacy, they have stronger incentives to pay 
attention to the long-term costs of immigration, in particular to those costs that can endanger 




necessarily offer political rights to immigrants, they may reverse immigration flows if they so 
desire.  
Another possible avenue along which liberal institutions encourage mass migration is that 
domestic and international laws recognizing universal rights may tend to produce norms among 
citizens that such rights should be indefinitely extended. Liberal political institutions seem to 
require people who think of themselves as good citizens to expressively support candidates who 
exalt the values of diversity and toleration, candidates who normally support mass migration.iv 
Whether liberal political societies tend to foster this kind of thinking, or it is just a fad in Western 
countries over the past few decades is hard to know. But once mass migration becomes a reality, 
it does seem natural that social norms would change in ways that undermine patriotic and 
nationalist sentiments, which signal a unique attachment to a people and place. Indeed, once 
mass migration becomes a reality, the need to expand the circle of altruism increases (Singer, 
2011), as liberalism can only prevail if liberal democracies become inclusive. This need to 
expand altruism indefinitely produces a new culture in turn: a robust type of universalist 
liberalism, which we now find in the West. 
 
c) Character traits and social norms 
 
In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche speculates that the fight for freedom tends to make people 
responsible, virtuous agents, but that attaining freedom makes them complacent and weak:  
 
My conception of freedom. – The value of a thing sometimes does not lie in that 
which one attains by it, but in what one pays for it – what it costs us. I shall give an 
example. Liberal institutions cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained: later 
on, there are no worse and no more thorough injurers of freedom than liberal 
institutions. Their effects are known well enough: they undermine the will to power; 
they level mountain and valley, and call that morality; they make men small, 
cowardly, and hedonistic – every time it is the herd animal that triumphs with them. 





The peoples who had some value, who attained some value, never attained it under 
liberal institutions: it was great danger that made something of them that merits 
respect. Danger alone acquaints us with our own resources, our virtues, our armor 
and weapons, our spirit, and forces us to be strong. First principle: one must need 
to be strong – otherwise one will never become strong (Nietzsche, 1889, Skirmishes 
38). 
 
While the passage can be interpreted in many ways, a central idea is that a lack of struggle makes 
most men weak, and that weaklings lack the intellectual vigor needed to build and preserve the 
institutions that allow us to prosper. If a lack of physical vigor and intellectual virtue results from 
any system that produces wealth and prosperity, Nietzsche’s point is less about liberalism than it 
is about institutions that promote wealth and the vices wealth enables.  
However, we may extend Nietzsche’s conjecture from character traits to social norms. It 
is possible that because of its foundational commitment to freedom and equality, and the 
increasingly loose interpretations of these concepts, social norms weaken under liberal 
institutions. According to Patrick Deneen, “because self-rule was achieved only with 
difficulty…the achievement of liberty required constraints upon individual choice. The limitation 
was achieved not primarily by promulgated law…but through extensive social norms in the form 
of custom” (Deneen, 2018, xii). “Ironically,” Deneen argues, “as behavior becomes unregulated 
in the social sphere, the state must be constantly enlarged through an expansion of lawmaking 
and regulatory activities” (Deneen, 2018, xiv). 
Presumably, Deneen is thinking of social norms governing trustworthiness, honesty, and 
other social virtues that facilitate trade, community, and cooperation. When these norms are 
working well, they lower the cost of transacting with strangers and minimize the need for formal 
institutions like courts and police agencies to uphold order. But when norms that facilitate trust 
become attenuated, more formal sanctions are needed to fill in the void. And these can be more 
expensive and less effective at promoting human flourishing.  
To be sure, Nietzsche’s conjecture that the traits required to produce liberal institutions 
are undermined by those very institutions is speculative. And Deneen’s idea that social norms are 
undermined by liberalism is a hypothesis that Deneen does not supply decisive evidence for. As 





Some people see history as a war of ‘isms’ – liberalism, conservatism, 
traditionalism, Marxism… The narratives they offer tend to be grand and sweeping 
(and to many people seductive, even thrilling). They see the movements of societies 
as a result of the triumph of some set of abstract ideas, without showing how those 
ideas actually produced those movements, and without paying attention to the need 
to identify micro foundations and mechanisms (Sunstein, 2020, p. 182). 
 
This is an important point: to show that liberalism produces certain outcomes, rather than merely 
correlates with them, we need to identify specific mechanisms. No evidence in this realm can be 
as decisive as a mathematical proof, but we think some conjectures are more plausible than 
others.  
One of the two claims we try to show in this paper is that liberal societies tend to alter 
social norms surrounding gender and reproduction in ways that threaten the sustainability of 
liberal societies. The freedom to form any kind of family, or to identify as any gender, is 
increasingly common in wealthy liberal societies. However one views traditional family norms, 
it is easy to see how radical permissiveness in this area – the sense that one is free to do 
anything, regardless of the social consequences – may contribute to sub-replacement fertility. 
One way it seems to do so is by fostering permissive norms surrounding sex and 
marriage. To take one example, no-fault divorce laws are now widespread throughout the West. 
This may be seen as fair to the extent that it reflects the principle that we should tolerate different 
lifestyle choices. But it also has the consequence that divorce rates tend to increase, and more 
women enter the workforce and marry much later (Allen, 2006). These trends are in turn 
associated with low birth rates, late pregnancies, and single-parent households. Late pregnancies 
are often problematic for mothers, as health issues increase, and there are social costs to children 
growing up in single-parent households, including lower life achievements and emotional 
problems (Rector, 2014). Governments often need to deal with such costs by making new laws 
and offering financial support – which can, in turn, further incentivize single parent households 
by making welfare payments available to single women. These lifestyle choices are now 




changes in laws modify social norms, even when those changes allow people to keep their 
traditional (marriage) practices.  
 
d) Unsustainable norms? 
 
There is some historical evidence that wealth and liberal attitudes about family tend to depress 
fertility by increasing indulgence in maladaptive behaviors that are less available in societies 
with more scarcity and less safety.v Indeed, many authors have pointed out the parallels between 
the cultural malaise of modern Western societies and the decadence of the late Roman empire 
which saw more wealth, increased sexual freedom, and decreased fertility (Caldwell, 2004). The 
poet Juvenal explained the decadence of the Roman empire as follows:  
 
Now we suffer the ills of a long peace. Worse for us than war  
this luxury’s stifling us, taking its revenge for an empire won.  
No single kind of crime or act of lust has been lacking, from  
the moment we were no longer poor: all vice pours into Rome.  
(Juvenal, Circa 115 CE, 231-285)  
 
It is not only maladaptive behaviors that wealth seems to invite. Our beliefs may also 
become exotic rather than accurate in times of opulence. Rob Henderson (2019) recently coined 
the term “luxury belief” to designate beliefs people form – or at least, publicly display – as 
signifiers that they are part of the intellectual elite. These beliefs are essentially costly signals, 
akin to luxury goods like designer clothes and jewelry. In order to be costly, though, such beliefs 
must be hard to form – for example, in some cases it requires high intelligence to form luxury 
beliefs in part because they conflict with reality itself and require cognitive dissonance. Anyone 
can believe the sky is blue. But it takes a clever person capable of a particular kind of mental 
gymnastics to believe there are no average differences between men and women, or that all 
humans have the same natural capacities, so that only oppression and injustice explain different 
outcomes. Yet these (and other similar) beliefs are now especially common among the 




people are more likely to hold false beliefs. But they can justify their false beliefs better – to 
others and to themselves.  
In all ages, people wish to distinguish themselves as members of some groups and not 
others. Inter-group competition is, after all, a key component of human evolution (Turchin, 
2016). Notably, in wealthy liberal democracies with competing political cultures, some elites 
uphold liberal radicalism – in part – to build an identity and distinguish themselves from their 
opponents. They do so by signaling solidarity with certain egalitarian ideas (Simler & Hanson, 
2018). For example, it has become commonplace in modern liberal societies to hold that 
traditional gender roles should vanish because they are the product of patriarchal oppression, not 
of human reproductive imperatives – as traditionalists often argue. Faith in such radical ideas 
signifies membership in an elite class of people (Reed, 2018), and deviation is often punished 
through social sanctions in the workplace and censorship on social media (Patty, 2019). Certain 
beliefs work as hallmarks of group membership. They allow people to signal their membership 
in powerful coalitions. Having the right beliefs is socially rewarded within those coalitions, even 
when it is clear to outsiders the beliefs are false (Williams, 2020). In this sense, expressing a 
false belief can be advantageous to the extent that it signifies one’s membership in a specific 
group.  
The luxury beliefs held by many of the elite in modern liberal societies have at least two 
important consequences. First, they foster social polarization by radicalizing non-liberals – 
including nationalists and populists – which in turn lowers social trust and cohesion. Second, 
these beliefs can spread maladaptive norms throughout society, in particular among those who 
imitate the behavior and attitudes of liberal elites (Boyd & Richerson, 2005, Chap. V). Indeed, 
this seems to be taking place. In the United States, for instance, people who hold liberal beliefs 
have considerably lower birth rates than conservatives, a trend that is widening in recent decades 
(Stone, 2020a). As reproductive fitness is tied to biocultural continuity (Gintis, 2011), including 
institutional continuity, this trend puts a question mark on the long-term evolutionary 
sustainability of liberal institutions.vi  
  
e) A maladaptive ideology? 
If liberalism fosters maladaptive behaviors within social groups, it will likely be replaced by 




ultimately has biological effects (Henrich, 2016). Belief systems and their rules function as 
cooperation mechanisms that help groups to be cohesive and resilient. Groups that are internally 
altruistic and capable of enhancing reproductive fitness tend to outsurvive competitors (Wilson 
& Wilson, 2007). Indeed, natural selection happens not only at the level of individuals but also at 
the level of groups – something that scientists now widely recognize (Birch & Okasha, 2014). 
Darwin put it simply, “there can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who … were 
always ready … to sacrifice themselves for the common good would be victorious over most 
other tribes; and this would be natural selection” (Darwin, 1871, p. 166). To be sustainable, then, 
liberal institutions would need to foster both group cohesion and reproductive fitness. And they 
would have to do it better than non-liberal institutions.  
Few liberals defend liberalism on the basis of its fitness maximizing capacities or 
evolutionary stability. A prominent exception is Friedrich Hayek (1988). He argued that classical 
liberalism is the most sustainable organizational system because it enhances group fitness better 
than any alternative. According to Hayek, limited government, free trade, and state neutrality 
regarding the good life allow groups to increase their wealth, which in turn helps them to 
increase their reproduction and carrying capacity. Liberal groups, in his view, will tend to 
expand and replace groups with tribal norms via cultural group selection.  
 
f) Low fertility and demographic challenges 
 
However, current evidence does not support Hayek’s theory (Faria, 2017). The populations of 
the most developed market economies and, in particular, of liberal democracies, have sub-
replacement fertility rates. By contrast, many populations of underdeveloped economies, often 
living under non-liberal regimes, display remarkable demographic growth. A similar dynamic 
can be seen within the West. For instance, subcultural and religious groups like the Amish – who 
reject modern technology and lifestyles – have birth rates that allow them to double their 
population every 20 years (Boyd & Richerson, 2005, p. 180). Indeed, religious fervor is a strong 
indicator of population growth. Global demographic trends reveal that religious/non-liberal 
populations radically outgrow liberal/secular populations (Inglehart & Norris, 2011). If these 
trends prevail, politics based on a religious worldview (or something similar) will displace liberal 




strongly influences who reproduces, and consequently what kinds of people populate a society 
(Henrich, 2016).  
To tackle the issues of sub-replacement fertility rates and labor shortage, Western 
governments often bring in immigrants from high fertility areas, such as sub-Saharan Africa – 
whose population may triple by 2100 (Cilluffo & Ruiz, 2019) – or from areas with large 
populations, like Asia or the Middle East. While Western governments may expect these 
immigrants to adhere to liberal norms of gender equality and individualism, it is unclear whether 
this will happen. Immigrants who retain fertility-promoting beliefs will have evolutionary 
advantages over low-fertility Western peoples. We should expect those who uphold fertility-
enhancing norms to increase in size and political influence, thus challenging liberal institutions. 
Notably, the current rise in identity politics within the West reflects – in part – demographic 
changes, and such changes might bring the rejection of current institutions (often seen as 
oppressive).  
 Some scholars have argued that sub-replacement fertility rates in the West may be a 
temporary phenomenon (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015). If so, liberalism is not under 
demographic threat. These scholars maintain that more gender equality can solve the fertility 
problem brought by female emancipation. They claim that with more equality between the sexes, 
or with more economic growth among women, we would be able to combine work and education 
with having children. Yet, when comparing societies across time, this view is not supported 
(Kolk, 2019). The countries with the highest levels of gender equality, and highest per capita 
income, such as the Nordic countries, have not seen a substantial increase in fertility.  
 But liberalism could prevail if the increasingly smaller population of liberals maintains 
power. After all, minorities sometimes rule over distinct majorities. Perhaps liberals will remain 
wealthier, more knowledgeable, more resilient, and with better technology than high fertility 
groups. Yet, liberals cannot prevent others from participating in politics without abandoning their 
liberal democratic beliefs. And in democratic politics, voting majorities count. Moreover, the 
fertility problem remains. If liberals cannot overcome sub-replacement birth rates and 
demographic contraction, any other advantages they may have will be insufficient to maintain 
institutional hegemony and sustainability.  
Of course, low fertility is not an exclusive feature of liberal democracies. Worldwide, 




grow, especially in the poorest regions where food and medical aid from the West is converted 
into more children (Azarnert, 2008). Declining birth rates are usually attributed to the expansion 
of female education worldwide and to the widespread access to contraception (Vollset et al., 
2020). Overall, the rise of living standards and global markets increased the freedom of women 
and weakened religious beliefs worldwide (Inglehart, 2021). Today, even the populations of 
some non-liberal regimes also reveal sub-replacement birth rates, notably in Russia and China. In 
the case of China, the recently revoked one-child policy contributed to their current low fertility, 
as it shaped reproductive norms for many decades, though so far birth rates have not rebounded 
even as China remains an autocratic state.  So, liberalism cannot be solely responsible for low 
fertility. 
 However, the post-war liberal order and its international institutions did foster global 
trends that produce low fertility, such as female liberation. They did so via diplomatic influence, 
movies, and various techno-cultural means (Chong, Duryea, & Ferrara, 2012; Jensen & Oster, 
2009). To counter the demographic consequences of these trends, both liberal and non-liberal 
regimes, such as those of modern Germany, Japan, and Russia, enact policies to boost birth rates 
(Brzozowska, Matysiak, & Sobotka, 2019). Notably, non-liberal governments in countries like 
Russia and Hungary tend to announce and promote those policies, while western liberal countries 
apply them discreetly. Such policies have had some success and contribute to halting cohort 
fertility decline, but they produce mostly short-run results. These policy efforts focus on material 
incentives, such as maternity leave, childcare support, cash transfers or tax cuts, and they have 
not changed the low fertility paradigm. Mere material incentives remain insufficient. Even easy 
access to reproductive technologies – like freezing eggs – may not change the paradigm if people 
are unpersuaded by the prospect of having many children.  
Religion and nationalism, by contrast, seem to be efficient at tackling the low fertility 
problem. Religiosity is a key predictor of fertility, and worldwide reproduction patterns show 
that religious populations reproduce much more than secular ones (Kaufmann, 2011). Indeed, as 
Jonathan Haidt has argued “societies that forgo the exoskeleton of religion should reflect 
carefully on what will happen to them over several generations. We don’t really know, because 
the first atheistic societies have only emerged in Europe in the last few decades. They are the 




Nationalism, too, seems to have a decisive impact on reproduction. Israel, for instance, is 
the only developed country with high fertility, thus showing that advanced societies are 
compatible with elevated fertility (Brzozowska et al., 2019). The Israeli government not only 
promotes birth rates via financial incentives, but also enforces nationalistic duties – duties to 
defend the existence and autonomy of the Jewish people. It is, after all, a country with a strong 
sense of collective identity and under permanent threats from neighboring groups. In the end, 
while religious Jews in Israel have the highest birth rates, even secular Jews have fertility rates 
that are above replacement (Okun, 2016). Religiosity and nationalism are arguably more efficient 
than material incentives at boosting reproduction, for the former shape our moral compass, while 
the latter simply help to fulfill reproductive desires. By shaping people’s moral compass in ways 
that make them see reproduction as a good in itself, or as a duty, religion and nationalism make 
reproductive habits less sensitive to material conditions. Religion and nationalism can foster high 
birth rates both under situations of scarcity and abundance, which produces long-term population 
growth, or at least population stability.   
Liberalism’s sustainability problem is, then, as follows: liberals cannot impose a fitness-
enhancing vision of the good life without violating their commitment to pluralism and individual 
liberty, so they must tolerate ways of life that minimize fitness. Non-liberal regimes, by contrast, 
can experiment with many different views of the good life and enforce them on societies without 
liberal restrictions. While non-liberal governments of countries like Russia or Hungary have had 
modest success in raising fertility recently, non-liberal regimes may develop successful moral 
and legal frameworks in that regard. Some of those successful frameworks may be quite different 
from those now in place.  
Of course, one may argue that there is more experimentation in liberal, open societies. If 
so, they should be better at developing solutions to their problems than non-liberal societies. 
Maybe so. But to better develop solutions does not mean that they can be implemented under a 
liberal framework. It is often difficult to implement certain restrictive solutions – from 
compulsory vaccination to governmental surveillance – while respecting individual liberties. 
Non-liberal governments, by contrast, have no such constraints. They can solve large-scale 
collective action problems by imposing novel codes of conduct from the top. Of course, such 
governments are also constrained in experimenting with novel codes, for if an experiment goes 




wider in non-liberal regimes. They are not tied to specific values and can adopt new ideologies 
or religions to enforce novel solutions. A prominent example of this flexibility is the Chinese 
government’s change from communism to market autocracy in the late 20th century.  
 
g. Freedom, Fertility, and Meaning 
 
Political institutions can change mass beliefs and behaviors. This was the case, for instance, with 
the expansion of Christianity, which first relied on the structures of the Roman Empire and then 
on states and monarchs (Henrich, 2020). Likewise, liberal and secular beliefs are more 
widespread in liberal polities now than 200 years ago, presumably because of the effect of liberal 
institutions – as well as key developments in the sciences, which provided robust explanations 
for our place in the world without involving supernatural forces. Some evidence indicates that 
the “secularized control of education … can account for virtually the entire increase in 
secularization around the developed world" (Stone, 2020b). If this is true, the expansion of 
liberal attitudes was strongly influenced by the growth of liberal institutions.  
In particular, elite and institutional framing can shape people’s preferences (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984). Cultural evolution in groups takes place largely through ordinary people 
imitating successful elites (Boyd & Richerson, 2005, pp. 12-13) or via diktat – where people 
internalize new values due to fear of punishment (Cofnas, 2018). Either way, the capacity of 
liberal institutions to produce adaptive cultural change seems limited. Not only do liberal elites 
exhibit beliefs and behaviors that do not increase fitness, but they also hold an ideology that – in 
theory – opposes rule by diktat. If there are secular strategies that can produce high fertility 
better than religion, liberalism would be unable to enforce such strategies without contradicting 
itself.   
 Indeed, modern liberal societies seem to be suffering from a lack meaning of the kind that 
is often associated with religion, or with the parochial values of a tribe or community or 
tradition. While the liberal rejection of a specific conception of the good can be liberating for 
some people, it can also create an environment in which many fail to see themselves as part of a 
civilization that is worth sustaining. The Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote eloquently 
about the loss of meaning in modern Europe as religious faith began to wane. A character in 





The secret of man’s being is not only to live but to have something to live for.  
Without a firm conception of the object of life, man would not consent to go on 
living, and would rather destroy himself than remain on earth, though he had 
bread in abundance…  Nothing is more seductive for man than his freedom of 
conscience, but at the same time nothing is a greater torture (1880). 
 
Without a sect or tribe or tradition to fight for, it may be hard for many to see why they should 
bother having children or making the kinds of sacrifices required by a lasting civilization. 
Nevertheless, liberal polities cannot prioritize the formation of families over the satisfaction of 
any other desires or preferences. Instead, in order to remain liberal, a state must stay neutral 
between different conceptions of the good that form the basis of a meaningful life, and which 
often give us reasons to have children. 
 
h) Declining social trust  
 
Sheer reproduction, however, is not the only element that confers advantages to social groups. 
Although a larger group size is often a favorable adaptation (Wilson, 2002, p. 36), the ability to 
cooperate is also critical. Smaller groups can outcompete and outlive bigger groups if the former 
have better cooperation strategies. But what makes people cooperate politically and socially? 
Aristotle provides the canonical answer: friendship. Likewise, in modern philosophy, John Rawls 
(1996) emphasizes the need for an overlapping consensus. And in contemporary political 
science, the answer is often social trust.vii 
Social trust facilitates cooperation and represents generalized trust in strangers within 
society. Social groups with members who can trust one another can better solve collective action 
problems – e.g. prisoner dilemmas, the tragedy of the commons, etc. Indeed, “individuals who 
lack faith in their peers can be expected to resist contributing to public goods, thereby inducing 
still others to withhold their cooperation as a means of retaliating” (Kahan, 2003, p. 72). 
Predictably, high levels of social trust are associated with greater economic growth, better 





If individuals are to cooperate without the state dictating the good life and punishing its 
deviants, liberal institutions must largely rely on voluntary cooperation – which in turn requires 
social trust. But the development of liberalism in the United States is associated with a decline in 
social trust. And the US, as the dominant post-war superpower, is the epicenter of global 
liberalism. In the early 1970s, around half of Americans declared that most people can be 
trusted; today, only less than a third do (Vallier, 2020, p. 1). As Kevin Vallier (2020) argues, this 
decline is causally linked with political polarization, which is growing fast in America. 
 However, this decline in social trust is not present in all liberal democratic countries. 
Northern European countries such as Norway, Sweden, and Finland remain among the most 
trusting countries in the world. To complicate things further, autocratic China is also among the 
countries with the highest social trust (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2016). Clearly, political 
institutions and their ideology are not the only features that elevate trust.  
A crucial feature of high-trust countries is ethnic homogeneity. Although scholars 
disagree about the causes of the decline in social trust, it is well-established that there is a 
“statistically significant negative relationship between ethnic diversity and social trust across all 
studies” (Dinesen et al., 2020, p. 441). This suggests that demographic uniformity fosters social 
trust. Ethnic diversity experienced locally – in neighborhoods – has the strongest negative effect 
on trust, which also shows the limits of contact theory – the theory claiming that interethnic 
contact increases trust between groups (Dinesen et al., 2020).  
Cultural evolution can explain why ethnic tribalism is so prevalent and resilient. Ethnicity 
comprises group traits such as phenotype, language, and mechanisms of social control, including 
religion and other sacred beliefs (Horowitz, 1985, p. 53). Humans use these traits as markers and 
mechanisms to produce in-group cooperation (Richerson et al., 2014). Because group traits are 
essential for cooperation, and ethnocentrism is likely adaptive (Axelrod & Hammond, 2006), 
ethnicities are often unwilling to give up on their cooperation mechanisms and markers. That is, 
they are reluctant to change their identities and abandon their collective interests. This 
unwillingness generates inter-group conflicts (and distrust), especially when collectives occupy 
the same space. The cultural mixing of different ethnicities often produces unclear norms and 
symbols, thus fostering a decline in social trust, including trust in one’s own group members 




group cooperation levels to increase or stabilize in contexts of genetic diversity (Giani, Heap, & 
Minos, 2021).  
By allowing people to have freedom of association and political participation, liberal 
democratic institutions increase cultural and ethnic factions, which are associated with political 
polarization. These outcomes are not inevitable, though, at least not in the short run. Switzerland, 
for instance, shows high levels of social trust while having several languages and ethnic groups 
within its liberal institutions. Swiss ethnicities display an overlapping consensus with historical 
roots that allows them to trust one another. Such a consensus can lead to larger coalitional 
groups, where smaller groups come together and form a larger identity. However, this consensus 
is often hard to achieve (Dinesen et al., 2020). It requires across-group friendliness, which can be 
difficult to foster in liberal societies that reject a significant role for the state in fostering group 
identity. 
Liberal institutions could try to prevent political polarization and assure demographic 
uniformity by curbing immigration. But, as explained above, these institutions have moral and 
economic incentives to increase diversity via immigration. Indeed, the US is perhaps the 
strongest example of this trend toward open borders, but western European countries 
increasingly rely on immigration too. As a result, most European countries have seen a rise in 
popularity of anti-immigration national-populist parties (Camus & Lebourg, 2017). And where 
nationalist parties achieved power – for example, in Hungary or Poland – liberalism is put into 
question or discarded. Of course, the governments of homogenous countries also require 
mechanisms to prevent political faction and low social trust.  
A crucial challenge for liberal institutions in diverse societies is to keep high levels of 
social trust and cooperation without enforcing specific ways of living on their population. Public 
goods games show that cooperation over long periods of time requires mechanisms to punish 
deviants (Fehr & Gachter, 2002). While people often begin by cooperating, they withdraw their 
cooperation if they see defectors go unpunished. But when people can punish defectors, 
cooperation increases, thus solving the kinds of collective action problems that states exist to 
address (Ostrom, 2000, p. 142; Turchin, 2006, pp. 98-99). 
 If liberals wish to foster across-group friendship in open societies with diverse 
populations, they need to promote some form of social solidarity, and enforce it. They need to 




the simple promotion of “openness” and “toleration” to foster cooperation. Indeed, not every 
culture that emerges in liberal societies (or arrives via immigration) will value openness and 
toleration, and a mere commitment to toleration is unlikely to motivate and bind people in ways 
that a religious commitment or a patriotic connection to a national destiny can. Moreover, liberal 
governments – if they are to remain liberal – need to punish deviants in ways that do not violate 
their fundamental commitments to freedom and equality, to toleration and openness. We already 
see strong signs in liberal countries like the USA that governments and large corporations (like 
Amazon, Google, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter) often collude to silence and punish people 
who express opinions that deviate from liberal orthodoxy (Patty, 2019). Ultimately, the level of 
punishment necessary to unify vastly heterogeneous populations under the same polity may be 
too high even for most non-liberal worldviews – such as communitarianism or conservatism. It 
would likely take extremely repressive measures to iron out cherished ways of life, enforce a 
common identity, and prevent the formation of identitarian factions in the absence of a common 
understanding. 
Liberal societies, then, seem to inevitably create polarization and low social trust. And, as 
Vallier points out, “as people trust each other less”, polarization “creates a vacuum the state will 
fill. When trust dies, it’s replaced by coercion and control” (Vallier, 2021). As such, it is difficult 
to see how liberalism can endure if it cannot impose a way of life that fosters across-group 
cooperation within society. In effect, to prevent political dysfunctionality, liberal governments 
may have to replace vague hopes that very different kinds of people will cooperate with a 
coercively enforced vision of the world. As cooperative groups tend to outsurvive dysfunctional 
groups (Wilson & Wilson, 2007), liberal societies are unlikely to have long-term stability. 
Jonathan Haidt’s (2012) moral foundations theory highlights the evolutionary weakness 
of the liberal worldview. While there are challenges to the details of Haidt’s moral foundations 
framework, it offers one way to think about the constrained set of moral motives that liberal 
societies depend on. On Haidt’s view, liberals are primarily motivated by the moral foundations 
of care, fairness, and liberty, while conservatives and traditionalists also promote authority, 
loyalty, and sanctity. In other words, liberals do not use the full range of moral foundations. And 
care, fairness, and liberty seem insufficient to maintain high levels of sociopolitical cooperation 
and social trust. Group loyalty and authority, for instance, likely evolved because they allow 




important for large groups, helping people work together toward common goals and to prevent 
faction and disaggregation. Bigger groups tend to be more productive than smaller groups 
because of economies of scale, unless the former suffer from cooperation problems (Wilson, 
2002, p. 36). One reason liberal societies are increasingly suffering from cooperation problems 
may be that – in Haidt’s terms – liberal institutions rely on an incomplete set of moral 
foundations, which encourage some of the social trends outlined above, and which prevents 
societies from acting as adaptive units over the long run.  
Liberal states are thus at a disadvantage when competing against more cohesive states in 
the international system. Without invoking evolutionary considerations, John Mearsheimer 
summarizes why the liberal order is likely to fail: 
 
The liberal order’s tendency to privilege international institutions over domestic 
considerations, as well as its deep commitment to porous, if not open borders, has had 
toxic political effects inside the leading liberal states themselves, including the US... 
Those policies clash with nationalism over key issues such as sovereignty and national 
identity. Because nationalism is the most powerful political ideology on the planet, it 




Liberalism seems ill-prepared to deal with the long-term challenges it faces.  These challenges 
include mass urbanization, mass immigration, and the adoption of maladaptive values. Such 
values in turn lead to sub-replacement fertility – which prevents biocultural continuity – and 
declining social trust – which hinders sociopolitical cooperation and weakens the 
competitiveness of liberal states in the international system. While non-liberal collectives also 
face some of these problems, they can solve them by experimenting with evolutionary strategies 
at large scales, namely, by implementing moral codes that violate values like freedom and 
equality, openness and toleration. Yet, most of these strategies are not available to liberal 
governments – which are, by definition, precluded from imposing communitarian notions of the 




Religion and nationalism are powerful forces. They can lead to conflict within and 
between groups. But they also seem to promote fertility and adaptive cooperation better than 
liberal political societies do. Ultimately, the winners in the evolutionary game of life are those 
who reproduce the most, not merely those who accrue the most power or resources at a particular 
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i Data on social trust only becomes available in the 20th century (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2016). And much of the 
recent literature is already out of date – social trust in the USA, for example, has fallen dramatically over the last 
few years. 
ii We are not focusing on “sustainability” in the environmental sense, but rather arguing that liberal polities may fail 
to be evolutionarily stable in competition with other kinds of political arrangements. We use “sustainable” and 
“evolutionarily stable” as synonyms throughout the essay. 
iii In 2020, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada and President Joe Biden of the USA even adopted the slogan 
and agenda of The World Economic Forum, an international organization of corporations: “Build Back Better.” 
They endorsed it using the covid pandemic as a reason to strengthen global trade and global institutions. 
iv According to the Brennan and Lomasky (1993) theory of voting, a vote for policy X is cheap, while doing what 
the policy entails is expensive. For example, it is easy to vote for more immigration, but much harder to accept 
immigrants into our house and support them with our own money. Expressive voting happens in large democracies 
because each individual has little ability to influence an electoral outcome with a single vote. Thus, one votes not by 
carefully thinking about one’s interests or the total consequences of an action, but often instead votes symbolically, 
in ways that express one’s allegiance to abstract moral goals.  
v Joseph Schumpeter (1942) made the somewhat analogous observation that capitalism would inevitably fail because 
of its material success. Capitalism, he thought, gave rise to disaffected intellectuals who had the wealth and leisure 
to grouse about how unfair their lives are because ordinary people fail to recognize their intellectual worth. 
vi We should emphasize that many self-identified conservatives in the West hold classical liberal beliefs. But the 
broad label “conservative” as contrasted with “liberal” tends to include nationalists, populists, and traditionalists 
who emphasize the value of family and community, of tradition and hierarchy, over individualism, freedom, and 
equality. 
vii Political scientists also use the term social capital, which refers to networks of relationships, shared norms and 
understandings that allow groups to function efficiently. Yet, as Francis Fukuyama notes, “social capital is a 
capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society” (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 26), so social trust is critical for 
the formation of social capital.  
 
